


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### Through a divided glass: Dualism, class and the Agrarian question in Mozambique

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# Through a Divided Glass: Dualism, Class and the Agrarian Question in Mozambique

BRIDGET O'LAUGHLIN

*This article argues that if we look at rural differentiation not only as emerging class stratification but also as changing divisions of labour, expressed in the diversification of rural livelihoods, we can see that proletarianisation in Mozambique was a deeply rooted process at Independence. The Frelimo party's vision of agrarian class structure was, however, based on a dualist model of a homogeneous subsistence-oriented peasantry opposed to an enterprise sector. Strategic options based on this vision proved to be economically unworkable and politically compromising. Subsequent years of war have neither levelled class stratification nor reduced rural livelihoods to homogeneous subsistence production. Hence the dualist premises underlying the smallholder model now projected by critics of Frelimo's socialist options are similarly flawed.*

## INTRODUCTION

The prism through which the past is seen reflects the concerns and assumptions of the viewer about the present. This is clear in contemporary discussion of the socialist agrarian policy pursued by the Frelimo party in Mozambique in the first years after Independence. Views of what should have been done then reflect policy options on agrarian restructuring today.

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Bridget O'Laughlin, Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Institute of Social Studies, PO Box 29766, 2502 LT The Hague, The Netherlands. This article is an attempt to provide a more reasoned account for the polemical argument advanced elsewhere [O'Laughlin, 1995]. It is based on the rural research work carried out by the Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA), Eduardo Mondlane University, in Mozambique, where the author worked from 1979 to 1990. The author thanks all of the CEA researchers, past and present, upon whose work she has drawn. She also thanks Henry Bernstein, M. Wuyts, G. Wellmer, Lucia Hanmer, and Haroon Akram-Lodhi for comments on earlier drafts of this article, and J. van den Berg for criticisms on differentiation unappreciated at the time.

The dominant critique of Frelimo's agrarian policy, what I call in this article the traditionalist account, emerged in the context of structural adjustment, post-modernism and the retreat from socialist projects. It denounces Frelimo for alienating the peasantry from its land and cultural traditions, and attributes the success of Renamo, the Mozambican opposition movement, to widespread peasant discontent.<sup>1</sup> Frelimo's policy of socialisation of the countryside has been called a second dispossession of the peasantry after the loss of land under colonial rule [Tanner *et al.*, 1992: 8].

Corresponding proposals for agrarian reform promote the smallholder model of development. They call for the restoration of tradition and the defence of the peasantry within a strategy of indigenous capitalist development. Control of land and local governance are considered to be the key agrarian issues. There are demands for an immediate halt to large-scale concessions of land, the general reform of Mozambican land law to assure greater stability in land ownership, the control of land distribution by local level political structures, and the restoration of the *regulado*, the syncretic system of chiefs, through which land and people within 'native reserves' were administered under customary law in the colonial period.<sup>2</sup>

The traditionalist account is not entirely convincing on historical grounds [cf. O'Laughlin, 1992]. It overestimates the opposition of the peasantry to Frelimo's initial measures and compresses the history of the war, making it seem as if Frelimo's power was generally contested in the countryside from Independence onwards. It ignores Frelimo's hesitancy to use repressive force against the peasantry and its consequent retreat from collectivisation of peasant production and residence. These historical problems reflect a theoretical tendency to treat the state as omnipotent and the peasantry as passive, leading to an underestimation of the extent to which rural people shaped the implementation of Frelimo's agrarian policy.

This article focuses on a further theoretical weakness in the traditionalist account: its implicit conception of a traditional, homogeneous peasantry (or smallholder sector), standing in opposition to large-scale commercial enterprises. This dualist conception leads to a narrow focus on land ownership as the major issue in rural class structure and to an overemphasis of the importance of 'traditional' chiefs as a cultural and political institution in rural life. It deals inadequately with the way in which questions of land and local governance in Mozambique, as in the rest of Southern Africa, are linked to labour regimes through the migrant labour system. It hides from view the central weakness of the smallholder model – its failure to recognise the importance of wage labour and off-farm employment for rural livelihoods. A superficial criticism of Frelimo policy in its socialist period thus grounds a simplistic approach to issues of agrarian reconstruction today.<sup>3</sup>

Ironically, the traditionalist account shares the analytical dualism underlying Frelimo's strategy of accumulation. Frelimo recognised the dependence of capital accumulation in settler enterprises on the exploitation of the peasantry, but then sought to restructure the system simply by breaking the links between them, relying on a supposedly autonomous state sector for accumulation. Current prescriptions for agrarian reconstruction that focus on smallholder accumulation invert this option, emphasising the autonomy of peasant production.

Post-Independence history in Mozambique can be periodised in terms of shifts in Frelimo's strategy of agrarian transition. The first phase, from 1975 to 1980, was defined by broad-ranging political consensus around the need for a rapid socialisation of production and residence through the expansion of state-farms, co-operatives, and communal villages. Opposition to Frelimo was almost entirely based in Rhodesia, and, if anything, promoted a sense of national unity. The second highly contradictory phase, from 1980 to 1983, was defined by Frelimo's shift to a bureaucratic and hierarchical model of rapid socialist accumulation based almost exclusively in state farms. Goods starvation in rural areas, the stagnation of state farm production, and widening support for the Renamo opposition movement from South Africa (amongst others) led to a rapid expansion of both the war and parallel markets in rural areas. Frelimo's strategy in the third phase, beginning with the Fourth Frelimo Party Congress in 1983, was initially defined as market socialism, but moved rapidly towards increased support for private commercial farming, and the distribution of some state farm land to multinational enterprises, Mozambican commercial farmers and some peasant households. This period was marked by the generalised dislocation of rural people and production by war. In the last phase, beginning with the launching of Structural Adjustment (and the death of Samora Machel) at the end of 1986, Frelimo negotiated peace with Renamo and international donors and abandoned any pretense of adherence to a socialist agrarian strategy, privatising all state farm land, liberalising markets, and granting large land concessions to foreign capital.

In this article I look principally at the first two periods, between 1975 and 1983, when the Frelimo government tried to implement an explicitly socialist programme of agrarian reconstruction. I argue that dualism was an ideologically compelling but analytically unuseful way to analyse Mozambican agrarian society by the end of the colonial period. Unifying capitalist class relations cut across divisions between town and country, between peasants and workers, between settlers and Mozambican farmers. If we look at rural differentiation not only as emerging class stratification but also as a changing division of labour, expressed in the diversification of rural livelihoods, we can see that proletarianisation in Mozambique was a

deeply rooted process. Thus Frelimo's socialist strategy, conceived in dualism, was difficult to implement and disastrous in its consequences. By implication, unless it can be shown that the subsequent years of war levelled class stratification and reduced rural livelihoods to homogeneous subsistence production, the traditionalist premises underlying the smallholder model are similarly flawed.

#### THEORISING RURAL SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The debate over past and present options on agrarian reform in Mozambique reflects more general theoretical and political issues in the analysis of the agrarian class structure emerging from colonial migrant labour systems in Southern Africa. Analytical ambiguity reflects persistent left political debate on how to reshape agrarian class structure at both a political and economic level in Southern Africa in the post-Independence and post-Apartheid eras. The problem of an appropriate analysis of agrarian class structure arose in Zimbabwe in the debate around the criteria to be used for admission of rural households to land redistribution schemes [cf. *Bush and Cliffe*, 1984; *Simon*, 1985], when the admission of households dependent on off-farm employment was thought to compromise a productive use of commercial land. It has surfaced again in discussion of the relative advantages of communal tenure vs. land-titles for smallholder producers. Political ambivalence around these issues is also evident in ANC proposals on land reform and the constitutional place of traditional chiefs.

Dualistic modes of analysis have possessed a kind of intuitive truth in Southern Africa because at a political level, colonial regimes were brutally dualistic and authoritarian. The historical owners of the land were transformed into the 'indigenous', the 'native' or the 'traditional', their institutions partially maintained yet subordinated to European law, settler culture, and capitalist class relations. Many African cultivators became migrant workers, strangers in one part of their own land, with households divided between reserves, locations and compounds.

Yet dualistic institutions contributed to the development of a non-dualistic agrarian class structure of great complexity. Varying relationships between land distribution and labour regimes mean that the conceptual couplets land-owning/landless and exploiting/exploited do not sort out well the relations that hold between and within rural households. There are various types and degrees of landlessness: landless squatters, tenants,<sup>4</sup> households with access to land only through contract farming schemes, and many with plots too small and infertile to secure subsistence. Yet there are also households with established use rights to adequate land within

communal tenure areas, others with individual title to marketable land under freehold, and still others with holdings they are unable to work for want of labour and inputs.

Similarly we cannot define clear boundaries between households that employ wage labourers and those that provide them. There are rural households dependent on income from off-farm employment for subsistence and others that use it to invest in commercial crop or livestock production. Some households survive by doing casual wage labour, others use remittances to hire casual wage labour for subsistence production, and still others hire wage-workers for commercial production.

Nor can we even be sure what constitutes wage labour without analysing its effects. There is a broad range of mechanisms for recruiting extra-familial labour for rural work beyond a clear wage contract: communal work groups operating entirely on the basis of generalised reciprocity and others in which some work only for food and beer; temporary integration of unmarried kin into households with subsistence in return for labour; lending of cattle and plough or gifts of food at harvest time in return for occasional labour casual day labour paid in kind.

Dualist migration policies were initially sharply gendered: men migrated while women reproduced labour-power. The result, however is a complexity of analytically troubling relations between class and gender, with women headed households encompassing a broad range of social forms [Peters, 1983], with varying gendered relations of authority within households and with women involved in off-farm employment in many different ways. Migration policies were also dualistic in age terms, with men recruited for manual work in their youth and exiled to reserves with women and children in illness or old age. Yet now there is a regionally and sectorally differentiated range of stability of employment for workers of all ages and a particular crisis of unemployment for rural and urban youth.

Stripping away appearances, Marxist work on Southern Africa developed a powerful central insight, conceived in opposition to the analytical dualism of modernisation theory: migrant labour must be understood as part of a unitary but contingent system of capitalist development, everywhere forged by the particular moments of local histories as well as its general tendencies. Theoretical attempts to concretise this insight and capture the complexity of class structure in migrant labour system have not, however, been so successful. Analysts using the conceptual framework of articulation of modes of production have fallen into dualism when they approach the analysis of the culturally glossed appearance of everyday rural life. Customary rulers, lineages and ritual powers become pre-capitalist institutions while compounds, locations and wage labour are capitalist.

In Mozambique, Marxists working on practical issues of socialist

agrarian transition in the Centro de Estudos Africanos (Centre for African Studies, hereafter CEA), under the research direction of Ruth First,<sup>5</sup> explicitly rejected the articulation approach and emphasised, in accord with Bernstein [1979], the ways in which commoditisation had integrated the reproduction of the Mozambican peasantry into the circuit of capital. We had difficulty, however, in theorising differences among and within rural households in the ways in which this integration took place (and consequent difficulty in establishing the political significance of differentiation). We retreated into the short-hand descriptive concept 'semi-proletarianisation' to describe the process of class formation in labour-reserve areas, at best a restatement of the problem. Attempting to apply Lenin's [1972] work on the development of capitalism in Russia to the analysis of migrant labour systems in Southern Africa, we glossed over the difficulties we had in defining the division of the peasantry into poor, rich and middle strata. This study attempts to show how the rural research of the CEA contributes to a clarification of these issues.

Clarifying the nature of the agrarian question in Mozambique, as in the rest of Southern Africa demands that we rethink the way we conceptualise the relationship between proletarianisation and rural differentiation. There is a tendency to speak of differentiation of the peasantry as a linear process in which the different incomes and resources of peasant households come to express social differences between different strata of the peasantry. In Southern Africa, the word differentiation, used in this way, lumps together analytically two different, but inter-related, processes of class formation in agrarian capitalist development.

The first, which I call here 'the diversification of rural livelihoods', reflects changes in divisions of labour, in processes through which people come to organise their work and reproduction in very different ways as commoditisation proceeds. The second aspect of differentiation of the peasantry is class stratification<sup>6</sup> – the emergence of sharp and continuing differences between households in control of means of production, including land, cattle and agricultural implements. These two aspects may proceed together with the expansion of the market and wage labour relations under capitalist development, but their rhythm is not necessarily the same. This was particularly true under colonialism in Southern Africa where the emergence of indigenous capital was politically blocked. These two analytically distinct aspects of differentiation are conflated in the common use of the concept of differentiation in still a third way – to define differences in income and consumption levels between rural households.

In the following sections I trace how dualistic colonial policies on land, labour and local governance in Mozambique led to a complex non-dualistic agrarian class structure in which diversification of rural livelihoods



outstripped class stratification. I wish to show that rural class formation in Mozambique is not an exceptional case in the region; it raises the same complex issues about the relationships between land, agricultural production and off-farm labour that recur everywhere in Southern Africa. I will then explore the confrontation between Frelimo's socialist dualism and this differentiated rural class structure.

#### COLONIAL LAND AND LABOUR REGIMES

For most of the period of effective colonial occupation (c.1890 to 1975), Mozambique was subordinated to three major forms of capitalist exploitation, based on a regional division of dominant labour regimes. These were the export of labour to South Africa in the South, recruitment of workers for sugar, tea and copra plantations in the Centre, and forced smallholder production of cotton in the North [Wuyts, 1981]. Cross-cutting the three major forms of exploitation of rural labour was a highly differentiated sector of settler farms and ranches, ranging from small family-based enterprises to large professionally managed estates, employing forced *shibalo* labour as well as low paid contract and casual labour. Rural migrants were also forcibly recruited for construction and port work in urban areas.

All of these labour regimes were unfree. Under the *indigenato*, the legal code applied to black Mozambicans, until the early 1960s all adult men were required to do six months of forced labour or to cultivate a hectare of cotton. In many areas women were also obliged to integrate cotton or rice as cash-crops with their subsistence production. A pass system restricted labour mobility to put downward pressure on wages and tie urban workers to their rural families.

Forced labour and control of labour mobility were reinforced by a rigidly dualistic system of control of land. As elsewhere in Southern Africa, native reserves were set up by the colonial state where land was administered under customary tenure systems, both excluding the peasantry from prime commercial land and inhibiting the development of a landless proletariat.

The Portuguese designated relatively smaller and more scattered areas for exclusively commercial exploitation than was done in South Africa or Zimbabwe, but as in the rest of the region the land rights of the Mozambican peasantry were residual – subject to erosion with the development of settler and plantation cultivation in prime commercial areas. Plantations and settler farms controlled land with access to water for irrigation or year round cultivation, land located close to major transport circuits or in peri-urban areas with good access to markets, land sufficiently fertile for demanding

commercial crops such as cotton, land suitable for permanent crops, and grazing land with easy access to watering points for cattle. Peasants were allowed to occupy state-lands on a contingent basis, and then expelled when some new plan for the use of the land was proposed. Peasants were regrouped along the roads in Nampula for cotton cultivation in the 1950s, for example, and then many were expelled in the early 1970s as new settlers took the land to grow cotton.

The link between land and labour regimes at the local level depended on political dualism – the sharp jural separation between colonial and ‘customary’ authority, in fact a hybrid system of customary tenure and Portuguese local level administration (the *regulado*). The Portuguese integrated where possible pre-existing local level political institutions into a grid of bounded territorial local authorities, extending even into urban areas. All black people were legally subject to a customary ruler (*régulo*) unless they specifically went through the arduous and humiliating procedure of ‘assimilation’.

Legally, the *régulo* had responsibility for administering the local system of land tenure, arbitrating disputes arising under domestic law, and punishing minor crimes. He collected head-taxes, recruited workers for both forced and contract labour, enforced and supervised forced-cropping, and organised markets, medical campaigns, tree-planting and local road maintenance. He was expected to provide political and military intelligence to the local Portuguese administrator, and to execute colonial directives at the local level. The *régulo* usually had a traditional title, worked and lived in African languages and cultures, and depended on ties of patronage to lineage-heads and neighbourhood leaders, but his tasks were firmly colonial, not pre-colonial or traditional in nature.

There were shifts in policy, both by capital and the state, from the 1950s onwards, which reflected the routinisation of wage labour in rural life, the declining competitiveness of Mozambican exports, and rising nationalism on the continent. Proletarianisation deepened throughout the country, blurring the regional division of labour. New settler farms and estates in the north recruited wage-workers. Plantations in the centre increased productivity with some mechanisation and stabilisation of segments of their labour force [Schaedel, 1984]. Although the southern city of Maputo (then Lourenço Marques) remained Mozambique’s capital and major industrial centre, expansion of regional transport, military occupation and the influx of settlers led to the growth of other regional urban centres – Beira and Nampula – in the 1960s and 1970s. Men from rural communities moved to transport corridors and urban centres for unskilled work in construction, loading, petty trade and domestic service and found new skills as artisans.

The routinisation of wage labour, combined with tight control over

access to commercial land meant that it was possible to foster the selective development of specialised peasant commodity production in some areas without threatening the basis of wage labour recruitment. There were political motives for attempting to develop a small Mozambican rural petty bourgeoisie that would potentially align itself with Portuguese rule, but economic contradictions also forced Portugal, as other colonial powers in the region, to reconsider their agrarian policies in the 1950s and 1960s. Portuguese development plans for Mozambique in the 1960s began to be concerned with rural unemployment and the influx of rural men into the cities, imports of staples were a major drain on the balance of payments [Mackintosh, 1987], and the quality and price of colonial cotton were not competitive on the world market [Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1980; Pitcher, 1993].

Smallholder commercial production of maize, based on use of hybrid seed and fertilisers, had already developed in fertile areas along the borders with Rhodesia, Malawi and South Africa where competitive markets bid up prices and specialised inputs could be acquired. Plantation demand for food for workers, never satisfactorily provided by the settler farms, led to the development of markets for dried cassava, entirely a peasant crop. Faced with serious shortfalls in grain production with rapid urbanisation in the 1960s, the colonial government developed extension schemes aimed at encouraging specialised smallholder production of maize, rice, and wheat. Colonial authorities also experimented with the introduction of new forms of property for selected strata of the peasantry in certain areas. Co-operatives were encouraged for specialised smallholder producers in cotton-growing areas in Cabo Delgado [Pitcher, 1993; Adam and Gentili, 1983] and in fertile well-watered areas of the South. A few Mozambicans were brought into some smallholder settler schemes, though with less land and security than Portuguese settlers.

By the end of the colonial period the growing interdependence of peasant cultivation with wage labour or other forms of off-farm employment had fundamentally changed the meaning of forced labour. Its function was no longer to compel captive peasant families into labour markets, but to maintain unfavourable terms of entry. Forced labour was increasingly used to complement rather than replace voluntary contract labour on plantations in the centre in the 1950s, to keep down wages and maintain worker discipline [CEA research Lugela, 1980; Schaedel, 1984]. Forced cotton cultivation kept the peasantry from diverting labour into other commercial crops as well as into subsistence production.

Though the *indigenato* was formally abolished in 1963, continuing state regulation of labour and commodity markets meant that in many areas rural families considered that forced labour only ended with Independence. The

emergence (or re-emergence in some areas) of specialised commercial peasant production in the 1950s, and particularly in the 1960s, thus coexisted with the heavily regulated exploitation of the Mozambican peasantry as miners, rural workers, and cotton producers. The *regulado* system of local governance remained an essential party of the regulatory apparatus of the colonial state.

#### RURAL DIFFERENTIATION IN MOZAMBIQUE AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE

At Independence in 1975, Mozambican rural society remained politically and culturally dualistic, but the underlying rural class structure was highly differentiated, with broad diversification of rural livelihoods and emerging class stratification. Wage labour and, more broadly, off-farm employment had become important components of rural livelihoods throughout Mozambique by the end of the colonial period. Women took on a broad range of farming tasks, including casual wage labour, while men migrated to mines, towns and plantations, and diversified their income-generating activities while at home. Thus although the methodology of the first national census carried out after Independence in 1980 was biased against recognition of diversity,<sup>7</sup> it reflects a differentiated rural class structure, in terms of rural livelihood sources, if not of class stratification.

Table 1 shows the percentages of rural men resident in each province who declared themselves to be either independent agricultural producers (excluding employers) and wage-workers (in any sector) in the 1980 census. The majority of rural men worked as independent peasant producers in only four provinces. In six provinces over 20 per cent of rural male residents were in wage-work. There is a large residual in all provinces, composed of the unemployed, independent non-agricultural producers, dependent family workers (and a minuscule number of employers). The proportion of rural women considering themselves to be principally wage-workers was 7.5 per cent in Maputo province, 5.2 per cent in Gaza province and under three per cent elsewhere.

The impact of off-farm employment on rural households appears even greater if we look for migrants who were not registered as rural residents, which we can do indirectly by looking at sex ratios within age-groups. The imbalanced sex ratios in Table 2 are particularly sharp in the lower age-groups, reflecting the fact that in many areas the classical model of migrant labour, where youths migrate and older men return to peasant production, still obtained. Thus the estimates of wage labour participation derived from Table 1 would be revised upwards if calculated over the life-cycle. Nonetheless there are many missing men in all age-groups in most

TABLE 1  
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE RESIDENT RURAL MALE  
POPULATION IN WAGE LABOUR AND INDEPENDENT AGRICULTURAL  
PRODUCTION IN 1980 (%)

Province	independent agriculture	wage labour	residual
Maputo Province	16.5	60.1	23.4
Gaza	35	41.5	23.5
Inhambane	52.5	20.3	27.2
Rural Sofala	35.7	40.2	24.1
Manica	38.9	33.7	27.4
Tete	53.9	16.6	29.5
Zambézia	46.5	27.4	26.1
Nampula	62.8	18.4	18.8
Cabo Delgado	67.5	10.5	22.0
Niassa	63.9	15.2	20.9

Source: Mozambique, General Population Census, 1980.

TABLE 2  
MALE/FEMALE RATIOS BY AGE-GROUP AND PROVINCE FOR HOUSEHOLD RESIDENTS  
PRESENT ON THE DAY OF THE CENSUS

Province	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54
Maputo Province	90	72	78	80
Gaza	72	59	65	69
Inhambane	71	56	68	79
Rural Sofala	81	72	79	95
Manica	75	67	80	94
Tete	68	63	68	77
Zambézia	82	74	79	105
Nampula	84	77	85	111
Cabo Delgado	76	71	75	96
Niassa	79	69	71	89

Source: Mozambique General Population Census, 1980.

provinces. Smallholder production was therefore not absorbing and integrating the labour that it had reproduced. Off-farm employment does not always contribute to the sustenance and reproduction of rural households; it may simply feed off them in the childhood and old age of migrants.

Rural off-farm employment included casual wage and non-agricultural self-employment within rural communities as well as permanent wage-work and migration. Women and children were recruited for seasonal work like

picking cotton in the North and were a large part of the rural wage labour force in Gaza and Maputo provinces in the South<sup>8</sup> in the colonial period. The 1980 census did not register casual work, but in rural research done by the Centre for African Studies we encountered many men as well as women and children doing wage labour on an occasional basis in rural areas – on state farms and plantations, on private farms and for other peasant households in their own communities. Rural households also got income from brewing, carpentry, house-construction, charcoal-burning, tailoring and itinerant vending.

The diversification of livelihoods is central to understanding changing gender relations in peasant production and the authority structure of rural households. In many areas Mozambican women have long been primarily responsible for hoeing, but men were also engaged in agricultural work and management of common household farming. The diversification of rural livelihoods has meant that many women have become the real everyday organisers of agricultural production. Table 3 summarises by province the percentage of independent peasant farmers in each district in 1980 who were women.<sup>9</sup> Although the proportion of women is highest in the southernmost provinces of Gaza and Inhambane, in half of *all* rural districts women made up more than 40 percent of those classed as independent peasant farmers. This group of women farmers is itself highly differentiated in terms of income-base and organisation, including *de jure* heads of households who were divorced, widowed or never married; those *de facto* heads of households who maintained strong links with migrant husbands, brothers-in-law or sons considered to be head of household; and wives or mothers living with male heads of household who worked off-farm in the area.<sup>10</sup>

TABLE 3  
THE PERCENTAGE OF INDEPENDENT PEASANT PRODUCERS IN RURAL  
DISTRICTS WHO ARE WOMEN, BY PROVINCE, 1980

Province	Districts	Mean	High	Low	Standard Deviation
Niassa	11	41	46	32	.04
Cabo Delgado	13	38	68	20	.120
Nampula	18	41	79	19	.134
Zambezia	15	46	62	23	.120
Tete	10	45	55	25	.084
Manica	7	44	53	32	.086
Sofala	8	52	70	31	.122
Inhambane	9	32	45	19	.080
Gaza	8	48	60	27	.107
Maputo	7	66	81	57	.093

Source: Mozambique, General Population Census, 1980.

Diversification of rural livelihoods did not necessarily mean a withdrawal from peasant farming. In a process similar to that traced by Arrighi [1973] for Southern Rhodesia, money acquired through wage labour was needed for the initial establishment of the household, bridewealth payment and house construction. In areas of the southern and central provinces, wages were used to buy cattle, ploughs, cisterns, hybrid seeds and fertilisers. Remittances from migrants and earnings from casual labour were used throughout the country to pay school fees, purchase clothing, and to buy food in lean periods resulting from drought, blight or illness of family members. Some households relied on wages and remittances for a large part of everyday subsistence.

Diversification of livelihoods means both different ways of organising agricultural production and different forms of integration of off-farm employment. Thus there were (and are) rural families in Mozambique that cultivated small subsistence plots and depended on earnings from off-farm employment to purchase much of their food. Some did casual labour, others received remittances from migrants, others burned charcoal, tailored clothes, or built houses. Some of these households were desperately poor; others sent their children to school, owned consumer durables such as bicycles and radios, and ate a varied and secure diet. Many of these households were headed *de jure* by women who were divorced or widowed; others were headed *de facto* by women on an everyday basis but an absent male head of household remained important in the authority structure of the household; still others were headed by men.

There were households that grew most of their own food, but also regularly marketed surpluses of cotton, cashew, sunflower, maize, cassava, rice or wheat. Some of these households depended entirely on their own labour, others recruited extra-household labour through collective work-groups, others hired casual labour, and still others had permanent wage-workers within their households. Again some of these households were poor and others were rich. Most were headed by men, but some were headed by women.

Differences in how households organised their agricultural production and in the gendered structure of authority were not necessarily constant over time. Many households followed a classical developmental cycle in which remittances were used to build up the productive capacity of the household for self-sufficiency in food production and marketed commercial production. Other households, however, were never able to assure themselves a subsistence base that freed them from casual wage labour or continuing migration. Others did not try to do so, finding in off-farm employment a solid organisational base for rural subsistence.

If we look at the diversification of rural livelihoods, we can see that

commoditisation, hence capitalist class relations, were deeply rooted in rural Mozambique at Independence. The extent of rural class stratification is more open to debate. Both O'Meara [1991: 92] and Hermele [1988: 15–17] have minimised its importance. The 1980 census registered an insignificant number of private agricultural employers of labour in all provinces (including, interestingly enough, a high proportion of women).<sup>11</sup> Certainly class stratification among Mozambicans peasants was politically obstructed under colonial rule by rigid limitations on Mozambican acquisition of land under freehold,<sup>12</sup> and by policies assuring settlers' privileged access to commercial land and credit. None the less research by the CEA in various provinces, by da Silva [1992] and Hermele himself [1988] in Gaza, and by Geffray [1985] in Nampula all suggest that class stratification was emerging with specialised commercial production, as those with access to labour were able to extend their control over commercial land. This was particularly true in irrigated areas, where there was smallholder plantation of tree-crops, and where dry-land farmers had access to colonial extension schemes and tractor-hire. The existence of this group underlies in Zambezia the petitions for return of settler land filed in various districts after the anti-fascist coup in Portugal in 1974 [Vail and White, 1980: 368].

The process of accumulation underlying the emergence of class stratification was based on two different styles of mobilisation of labour recorded elsewhere in eastern and southern Africa [Cheater, 1984; Mamdani, 1987; Sender and Smith, 1990]: one dependent on traditional mechanisms such as sponsorship of work-groups, polygyny and integration of kin within the household; the other more clearly dependent on hiring wage labour. Where Mozambicans managed to consolidate their hold on commercial land, they generally followed the first path. They were often part of the structures of local governance, or kin of *régulos*, with some access to tributary labour. Those who depended principally on hired wage labour tended themselves to be salaried workers, with a regular investment fund. These were nurses, school teachers and a few skilled workers. Low wages on the mines (until the 1970s), farms and plantations of the region, made it difficult for most labour migrants to accumulate an investment fund through saving.

In discussing rural differentiation at the time of Independence, it is important to remember that settler farming was itself highly differentiated, ranging from Portuguese family-run farms barely distinguishable from those of commercialised and specialised Mozambican farmers<sup>13</sup> to large corporate estates. Settlers also used a wide range of forms of labour mobilisation, including informal share-cropping, exchange of food or ploughing for work, forced prison labour, contract labour and free wage



labour. Underlying the capacity for both settlers and Mozambicans to accumulate through commercial agricultural production was the diversified basis of rural livelihoods, which made it necessary for some members of some rural households to work in the fields of others – for immediate payment in food, wages and services, or for longer-term less specific claims of security.

The shape and depth of rural social differentiation varied sharply from region to region in correspondence with the classical unevenness of capitalist development.<sup>14</sup> As elsewhere in Africa, diversity of rural class structure, expressed in ethnic or regional terms, marks Mozambican politics today. This diversity partially reflects the tripartite regional division of labour in forms of exploitation. Parts of southern Mozambique were much more intensively proletarianised than the rest of the country, whereas income from crop sales was markedly more important for peasant household in many districts of Nampula<sup>15</sup> and some areas of Zambezia and Manica. But regional boundaries between different forms of exploitation were never entirely fixed, and growth of both settler farming and specialised smallholder production across all regions of the country at the end of the colonial period reinforced economic and political divisions *within* provinces between labour reserve areas – with infertile soils, inadequate surface water and poor roads – and centres of accumulation. Even within districts, there were divisions between areas where cash earnings derived almost entirely from migrant wages, and prosperous areas with roads and shops and both settler and peasant commercial production.

Mozambican rural economy and society at the end of the colonial period, despite the abolition of the *indigenato*, was still structured by dualism at a political and rural level. At an economic level, however, the complexity of capitalist class development meant that dualism did not hold. Although no consolidated Mozambican petty bourgeoisie had emerged, it was not possible to identify a clear and homogeneous peasant sector, standing in opposition either to wage labour and capital or to urban residents. The welfare of many rural households was determined by the level of wages and the prices of subsistence goods, while for others the prices of agricultural commodities and inputs relative to general consumer goods remained central, and for many both were important.

#### A SOCIALIST STRATEGY OF AGRARIAN TRANSFORMATION (MIS)INFORMED BY DUALISM

When Frelimo looked at this differentiated agrarian structure at Independence, it saw dualism: an economy of two sectors, one traditional or semi-feudal and the other capitalist [cf. *Saul*, 1985: 59]. It saw modern

settler farms opposed to the mass of the peasantry employing rudimentary techniques to produce little more than subsistence. It saw the rural/urban and regional discrimination in social services and markets that pit townspeople against the peasantry and ethnic groups against each other. Frelimo recognised the links between the two sectors of the economy. It saw capitalist farms exploiting unskilled, unorganised and poorly paid migrant workers and colonial authorities employed traditional chiefs to extract from peasants the little surplus they produced. These linkages were, however, dependent on political violence, the resort to forced labour and forced cropping by the colonial regime, since the structural involvement of the peasantry in the market was very weak.<sup>16</sup> Frelimo recognised an embryonic rural petty bourgeoisie (indeed this was the group from which much of the Frelimo leadership had come), but saw it as economically weak and politically compromised by links to colonial authority. Thus, given the flight of the settlers, there would be in Mozambique only two principal classes, workers and peasants, based in the two sectors of the economy [Machel, 1976].

To abolish dualism Frelimo wished to move quickly towards the construction of a single nation, a unitary society based on socialist development and the alliance of peasants and workers. It adopted a series of critical legal and social measures aimed at the destruction of dualism – the establishment of a unitary system of local governance with the abolition of the *regulado* and the election of ‘Dynamising groups’, setting up uniform systems of health care and education under state monopoly, promoting literacy in Portuguese as the national language, the establishment of a single set of consumer and producer prices for staples and other basic necessities in all areas of the county, the loosening of remaining restrictions on rural/urban movement, and the nationalisation of land. The land rights of existing occupants were recognised if land was used productively, but the state was to determine the criteria for productive use.

The fundamental assault on dualism was, however, to be the socialisation of production in both sectors of the agrarian economy. Given the absence of a rural bourgeoisie, Frelimo envisioned no substantial opposition to this project [*ibid.*]. Frelimo’s Third Congress in 1977 made a strategic decision to reject private ownership of commercial land. Most scattered settler farms were to be converted into large agro-industrial complexes where the economies of scale necessary for mechanisation would allow rapid accumulation within agriculture and where a strong rural proletariat would be forged. Priority in investment was to be given to the state sector because of the backward subsistence orientation of the traditional sector. Investment in the state sector could be maximised by restricting supply of consumer goods to the subsistence sector which did not require them for survival.

Production in the traditional sector was, however, also to be rapidly collectivised in co-operatives. This would require little investment because the immediate advances in productivity resulting from the joining together of scattered subsistence production in larger collective units would be sufficient to draw the peasantry voluntarily into co-operatives. Household production was to become a marginal subsistence complement to collective production in state farms or co-operatives: each family was eventually to have no more than one hectare of rain-fed land or one-half hectare of irrigated land.

The dualistic inequities of colonial consumption patterns would be effaced by subordinating rural markets to a central planning process. Links between state farms, private capitalist farms, co-operatives and peasant households were to be established through the plan. The socialised sector would be self-sufficient: each unit would have a stabilised labour force; food for units producing industrial crops would flow through the plan from other state farms and co-operatives. A technologically and organisationally advanced state sector would support the development of peasant cultivation in the co-operatives. State provisioning of basic social services, the control of prices of basic commodities and the organisation of a network of people's shops and consumer co-operatives, would assure that basic needs were met despite the austerity that rapid accumulation would require.

Although there are many political criticisms to be made of Frelimo's imposition of this strategy of accumulation on the peasantry [Saul, 1993], I would argue that its central weakness was the premises on which it was based. The distinction between a modern market sector opposed to a traditional subsistence sector did not hold true by the end of the colonial period, nor can any two-sector model capture the complexity of the agrarian economy. Although rural class stratification was relatively weak, the complex diversification of rural livelihoods reflected the extension of capitalist class relations throughout the countryside and made it impossible to speak of two clearly defined classes of peasants and workers. In the following section, I will trace how the confrontation between the agrarian class structure that actually existed and Frelimo's dualist strategy led to the quagmire of unworkable policies and the loss of political legitimacy.

#### THE STRATEGY CONFRONTS SOCIAL REALITY ... ?

Particularly after its Third Party Congress in 1977, Frelimo attempted an aggressive implementation of its agrarian strategy – mobilising people to move from dispersed homesteads to communal villages, concentrating investment in a large mechanised state sector, encouraging immediate co-operativisation of peasant farming,<sup>18</sup> restricting private markets and

commercial production, and privileging wage-sectors in the supply of consumer goods. Where abandoned settler land was concentrated in large blocks, it was integrated into state farms. Most smallholders who had moved into irrigation schemes were removed [Hermele, 1988]. Scattered outlying farms became producer co-operatives, although some land was occupied by private commercial growers.

Investment was concentrated in mechanisation and infrastructural support for the state sector – consolidating and extending the irrigation grid for large-scale cereal mono-cropping farms in the river valleys, maintaining and extending plantation production of export crops, and mechanisation of large-scale cotton production. To assure expanding economies of scale, peasant land-holdings interspersed between abandoned settler farms were occupied, and targets for hectareage under cultivation were set higher and higher each year to justify patterns of investment. The banking system, which had included crop institutes providing credit to settler farmers, was nationalised and reorganised to reflect these priorities, with state farm debt financed by money creation by the central bank [Wuyts, 1989].

The restriction of private markets applied to all aspects of rural trade affected by state policy – provisioning of inputs and consumer goods to private producers, the retail trading grid, and rural transport – and led to an acute goods famine in the countryside. The supply of investment goods was sharply restricted outside state farms and co-operatives, undercutting independent artisanal production as well as private commercial farming. Ministry of Agriculture estimates suggested that in 1980 only 50 per cent of the hoes needed by the peasantry were distributed [Yáñez Casal, 1988: 164–5]. Since it was presumed that the peasantry could produce its own basic subsistence, wage-sectors and urban dwellers were given priority in plans for distribution of consumer goods. Basic items that all rural families wanted to buy – oil, salt, sugar, soap and cloth – became inaccessible during most of the year. Rural feeder roads were not maintained and bus-service was reduced, as investment in transport was concentrated in completion of the north/south arteries linking major urban centres. Access to transport and basic commodities was not viewed as essential for peasant livelihoods.

The initial response of rural people to many aspects of Frelimo's programme in the countryside was positive, sometimes aggressively so.<sup>18</sup> There was broad mass participation in the selection of members of the local dynamising groups and support from many for the abolition of the *regulado*. Small collective fields were enthusiastically cultivated across the country [Dolny, 1985]. Workers occupied many abandoned farms and held land and equipment in wait for Frelimo.

Yet over time Frelimo retreated from many of the central aspects of its rural programme. The traditionalist account is ingenuous in attributing the

spread of war to the socialisation of the countryside because so little collectivisation of peasant residence and production was ever realised. Frelimo maintained and even heightened its strategic dependence on accumulation in the state farm sector until the Fourth Party Congress in 1983, but retreated from the attempt to implement villagisation at a mass level, adopted a gradual and vacillating approach to co-operativisation, and accepted a role for private trade and production in rural areas.

The reasons for this retreat have to do with the diverse ways rural people responded to Frelimo's programme, which, conceived in dualism, proved difficult to implement and gave rise to contradictions which undermined its intent. Central goals of Frelimo's agrarian policy – accumulation in state-enterprises, co-operativisation of peasant production, egalitarian distribution of basic needs through the plan – were compromised not because they were part of a political project alien to traditional peasant culture but because they were defined in ways incompatible with the agrarian class structure they addressed. And the troubled implementation of Frelimo's agrarian strategy sharpened the rural class stratification it was intended to preclude.

#### *Accumulation in State Enterprises*

Frelimo's strategy of accumulation ultimately failed because the state farms consumed surplus instead of producing it. Various studies showed that the foreign exchange cost of importing the food the farms produced would have been less than the cost of their equipment and inputs [CEA research *Moamba*, 1978 and *Sabie*, 1980]. The reasons for this failure may appear to some to be self-evident given the rigidities noted by Kornai [1992] and Ellman [1981] in the socialist model of agricultural management and its dogmatic belief in economies of scale. None the less, probing more deeply two major failings of the state farms – persistent shortages of casual labour and poor management of inputs – provides indications about the organisation of the rural economy with implications for agricultural policy options today.

Most state farms were unable to recruit casual workers when they needed them. This contributed to low yields because some tasks were left unfinished and others were completed much later than technically required. Hedging against labour shortages led state farm managers to keep workers on when they were not needed and thus inflated the wage-bills of the state farms.

The labour recruitment problem can be interpreted as evidence for the dualism of traditionalist account and proof for the superiority of the smallholder model. The peasantry, it can be argued, will refuse to work for others if it is not forced to do so, as long as it has access to land for its own

cultivation. For example, Hermele [1988] attributed the weakness of state farm production in the Limpopo valley to the refusal of local peasants, angered by their displacement from prime irrigated land, to work those lands for the state. CEA studies emphasised that cropping patterns on state farms mirrored patterns of labour demand on peasant holdings and thus fostered competition for seasonal labour between state and peasant farms, leading to labour shortfalls on state farms for critical tasks such as weeding. There is considerable truth in these observations, and yet the image of a homogeneous peasantry, either giving or withholding its labour, abstracts from the differentiated world of rural livelihoods where some households provided casual labour and others did not.

Taking Hermele's case, there is no evidence that opposition to the state takeover of irrigated land came from those who had done most of the casual labour on settler farms. These were of two kinds – contract workers recruited from areas outside the valley and local people, mainly women and children, recruited from poor households. Contract workers, concerned with maintaining the basis of wage employment, often defended the integrity of the land against encroachment by local people, holding out for the formation of a state farm or a co-operative. Many of the poorest households, headed by women, lacked valley land and were not interested in occupying it, as they had neither implements nor sufficient labour to work it. Nor had they the resources to refuse to work as a political protest.

The labour problems of the state farms were not caused by the hostility to wage labour of a recalcitrant 'uncaptured' peasantry. The problem was the undifferentiated dualist model of both peasantry and agricultural enterprise with which Frelimo worked. The colonial enterprises integrated by Frelimo into the state sector varied in scale from large plantations to small family farms, in crops from tea to maize to vegetables, in technology from rainfed cultivation and animal traction to large-scale irrigation and crop-spraying by air. Their insertion in local labour markets was correspondingly varied, with recruitment of different kinds of rural workers through diverse mechanisms: contract labour, extension of credit at a company shop, payment in kind, advance of inputs, ties of patronage with local *régulos*, political pressure on local administrators for forced labour. Work was also organised in very different ways. There were plantations that functioned as 'factories in the field' with shifting labour-forces, but also farms where long-term workers knew a lot about the range of soil and planting conditions and even the quirks of particular machines.

Frelimo regrouped scattered settler farms into large units, with common methods of planning and management centrally defined by the Ministry of Agriculture. Planners extended specialised mono-cropping beyond the cropping patterns of settler farms, thus exacerbating the peaking of seasonal

patterns of labour demand. It was assumed, in a kind of loose version of the Lewis model, that labour was almost infinitely available from the subsistence sector. In planning methodology, labour was treated as a residual, derived from land and input availability within a particular cropping pattern. There was no recognition that state farms operated within a complex labour market of diversified enterprises both recruiting from distant reserves and hiring locally in competition with the labour demands of surrounding peasant producers, some of whom also recruited extra-household labour.

Frelimo abolished the contract labour system, as a disguised form of forced labour, but did not provide the security of livelihood needed to recruit large numbers of workers, particularly young men, on a voluntary basis for large plantations and mono-cropping farms. Seasonal peaking meant that what was needed was a large number of workers for short periods of time [CEA research *Baixo-Limpopo*, 1979; *Lugela*, 1980; *Angónia*, 1982]. For field tasks, workers were paid a daily task wage rather than a monthly or weekly salary. On wage lists on one large state farm, casual workers were not identified by name but only by number and the descriptive word "peasant", indicating their insecurity of employment and wage level. Degradation of the rural transport system made the movement of workers from labour-reserve areas to state farms time-consuming and expensive. Absence of consumer goods in rural shops meant that casual workers could not translate wages into improvement in livelihoods.

Nor were living and working conditions on state farms conducive to the seasonal stabilisation of agricultural workers. Priority for expansion of productive capacity over social investment meant that working and living conditions were particularly abysmal on new state farms and on large units formed out of smaller settler farms. At an agro-industrial complex in Tete province, workers slept in warehouses and some in an old pig-stye [CEA research *Angonia*, 1982]. There was no money for supplying blankets for those sleeping on the ground in cold upland areas, protective masks and clothing for those applying insecticide, boots for those wading in irrigation channels, or rain-capes for tea-pickers. Food provisioning through the state system was weak, so workers often went hungry.<sup>19</sup> The level of alienation among manual farmworkers was high, particularly among those who had worked on settler farms and felt that state farm managers ignored their skills and knowledge, ordering them, for example, to plant potatoes on land that was inadequately drained. Workers attributed these problems to the youthful ignorance of managers, but they actually reflected a general management model in which all casual workers were transient 'peasants'.

A conversation I had with a young field-worker in Angonia illustrates how the labour shortages of state farms were shaped not by the

unwillingness of rural people to do wage work, but by the conditions of employment provided by the state farms. I had interviewed him previously and thus called him by name. 'How did you remember my name?', he asked, 'Here I am only a number'. He recounted with anxiety that he came from a distant region of the province. He needed wage-work to help support his family and did not have enough education to get a skilled job. He wanted to continue working at the state-farm, but was not sure that he could endure it. He could not sleep well at night with only burlap bags for cover, was tired of eating meager rations of maize and potatoes, found the daily targets hard to meet, worked everyday with a new group of people, and had found no mates.

Farm managers also tried to recruit casual workers from farming households in areas surrounding the state farms. But goods starvation meant that there was little to be bought for money and hence little incentive to work for poor households concerned with finding ways to supplement their own subsistence production. Some farm managers obtained extra quotas of salt or sugar (or diverted part from other workers' quotas), to pay women and children for casual work. They also turned to local representatives of the state and party, who were expected to resolve the labour problems of the farms since they were state enterprises. Political mobilisation ceased to be a temporary expedient and became a system of recruitment, just as it had been in the colonial period. There was not, however, a high level of compulsion in the system; it did not provide regular supplies of workers when needed.

Poor management of inputs was another cause of low productivity on state farms. They arrived in short-supply or late and were applied inopportunistly. They sat unused and degrading in warehouses. These problems were usually attributed by farm managers to the failings of the planning process at the level of the Ministry of Agriculture. Certainly failure of input supply needs to be understood both as part of the highly import-dependent choice of technique on state farms, the consequent dependence of accumulation on export earnings, the preference of socialist countries for furnishing investment goods over inputs and spare-parts, and some of the classical problems of coordination in socialist planning in agriculture [cf. *Ellman*, 1981]. There was, however, another parallel reality, which farm-managers were not quick to reveal, that reflects both the diversity of rural livelihoods and the emergent class stratification of rural production in Mozambique: yields were also low on state farms because some implements, inputs, fuel, spare-parts, transport and even irrigation water intended for them were being applied elsewhere.

Most of the older skilled workers and many farm managers farmed themselves, and used their regular monthly wage to hire workers for their own fields. Some used this wage labour only to help their wives and



children to improve their basic consumption level, but others were specialised commercial producers [CEA research *Alto-Zambézia*, 1980; 1981; 1982; *Angónia*, 1982; *Marracuene*, 1983]. State farms were generally located in areas where conditions favoured the maintenance or development of private commercial production. Locally based workers used state farm tractors to plough and grade their own fields, and sometimes those of other private farmers, on the side. Given the shortage of inputs in local official markets, and high prices in parallel markets, skilled workers and managers used their connections to buy or acquire inputs through the state farm for use on their own farms or for resale [CEA research *Angonia* 1982 and *Marracuene* 1983]. There was no incentive for workers to insist on adjusting unrealistic production targets downward, since targets determined supplies of inputs and fuel. Thus many skilled permanent workers, rather than being the core of a rural proletariat, became a nucleus of private accumulation of capital, either as commercial producers or in speculative trade.

#### *Co-operativisation of Smallholder Production*

The major problems of the co-operative movement were its marginality and its low productivity. Producer co-operatives that survived in rural areas were almost entirely based in former settler farms. Only a tiny proportion of the rural population joined co-operatives, the collective people's fields were abandoned, co-operatives that did function lost members over time, and co-operative members did not pool their individual holdings to work together. Only in some peri-urban co-operatives, where members' households had a diversified income base, and among some Frelimo veterans of the war of national liberation [*Dolny*, 1985], did participants do most of their farming collectively. Like the state farms, co-operatives did not use their resources productively: they cultivated collectively only a small part of the area they controlled and ran up large debts.

For the traditionalist account, the failure of the co-operatives is unproblematic, since socialisation of the countryside is viewed as an alien project imposed upon the peasantry. Initially within the Centre for African Studies, our criticism of Frelimo's agrarian strategy stressed the weakness of state investment in the co-operative movement relative to that accorded to the state farms, and the preponderance of top-down planning in which the state imposed unrealistic plans upon co-operative members. Although we emphasised the importance of conceiving co-operativisation as a long-term process, only in 1982 did we begin to challenge Frelimo's conception of a single strategy of co-operativisation for all strata of the peasantry [CEA research *Angónia*, 1982; *Marracuene*, 1983; *Castel-Branco*, 1984].

Our criticism of the forms of state action was appropriate, but when we began to look more systematically at problems in the internal dynamics of

the co-operatives and the ways peasants themselves shaped outcomes, strategic issues emerged more sharply. Co-operatives that did receive support generally did not perform better than state farms. Co-operative members accepted unrealistic plans even when they knew they were impossible to carry out. Few co-operatives actually followed the plan; members did not simply or passively do what they were told; what they were doing was sometimes interesting and obscure. To understand the failures of the co-operative movement, one must look at how which rural differentiation shaped the composition, authority structure and activities of co-operatives.

Issues of social differentiation surfaced early in intra-co-operative conflicts, indicating that a co-operative policy that presumed the common interests of all potential members was problematic. There were struggles for control of co-operatives formed from settler farms between former contract workers and surrounding households. These could be interpreted as ethnic conflicts between insiders and outsiders, but reflected the differences in the ways they organised their livelihoods. The former workers wanted land and regular employment. Local peasants, themselves with varying livelihoods, wanted the possibility of greater security and higher income, but considered the co-operative as an adjunct to their individual production. Frelimo authorities obliged both groups to work together, but in most such cases former farm-workers abandoned the co-operatives [*CEA research Moamba*, 1978; *Ritter*, 1978; *Harris*, 1980].

The diversified basis of rural livelihoods was also reflected in patterns of participation and authority within co-operatives. In Gaza and Maputo provinces and in peri-urban areas, the great majority of co-operative members were women, often divorced or widowed. Elsewhere the gender composition was roughly equal or men dominated. In all cases, however, the absence of young men was notable and older prosperous peasants dominated co-operative leadership, while women did much of the actual field-labour, either as members or as surrogates for husbands, fathers or uncles. Prosperous male farmers and community leaders joined co-operatives for complex political and economic reasons, which did not include counting on much direct income from co-operative production. Sometimes they were able through the co-operative to obtain implements and inputs unavailable to individual producers on the local market. In one co-operative in Maputo province, for example [*CEA research Marracuene*, 1983], a small minority of co-operative members acquired individually, at a subsidised price, ploughs intended for introduction of animal traction into the co-operative.

Young men avoided the co-operatives because they wanted steady wage-work. Roesch [1986: 144] noted the general absence of young men from

communal life in Gaza; they were always travelling back and forth to Maputo looking for work. The problem was not limited to the South, although the gender imbalance in co-operatives was most marked there. The Niassa delegation to a National Conference on Co-operatives in 1980 included a boy of about fifteen. When the issue of non-participation of young men in co-operatives was discussed in the work-group I attended, he was asked why other young men were not following his example. "They are all looking for work", he responded, "and I am not yet old enough." Co-operatives were not an alternative to off-farm labour; they simply did not provide the regular income base needed to establish independent rural households.

Given the gendered division of labour, which in many areas assigned responsibility for weeding and hoeing principally to women, and the high proportion of women who were independent smallholders, a central problem of collectivisation of peasant cultivation was the nature of women's work. Most co-operatives did not address the issue. It was assumed that women would provide subsistence from small family plots, care for children, cook, fetch water and firewood, and somehow also work in co-operatives. Only a small proportion did – older women with fewer children to care for, or women whose independent production was so insecure that the co-operative was a hedge against hunger. In the peri-urban co-operatives, women joined because extra quotas of staples and consumer goods were sold at official prices, childcare was organised and some were paid a small monthly advance. Elsewhere women joined co-operatives because of their patronage ties to the prosperous peasant farmers who dominated co-operative leadership of the co-operative, obtained inputs at official prices through it, and gave women food in return for casual labour in their fields.

The dependent position of women members reinforced the dominance of co-operatives by prosperous men farmers. These issues were discussed within co-operatives, or sometimes expressed in plaintive songs,<sup>20</sup> but not confronted politically. Further, despite Frelimo's emancipatory programme, women did not have the skills in reading and writing that they needed to invoke Frelimo authority on their behalf. Literacy classes were initially well attended by women, but they were given only in Portuguese, and women's experience had not given them the bi- or tri-lingualism that many male migrant workers had. Where women did assume positions of authority within the co-operatives, as in the peri-urban co-operatives of Maputo, they were often literate wives and daughters of skilled urban workers, some with their own commercial plots and employing casual wage labour. Their own class position distinguished them from the mass of women members [CEA research Maputo Green Zones, 1985].

Differentiation was also at the root of a series of continuing disputes between the Ministry of Agriculture and co-operative leaders. The first of these concerned forms of payment. Co-operatives were to exclude those from households dependent on wage labour, yielding a clear separation between workers and collectivised peasants. Income was to be derived from the sharing out of income after crop-sales and reimbursement of bank credit. But many of those who joined co-operatives, both in the irrigated valleys of the South and peri-urban areas, needed a regular cash income to survive. Some co-operatives began paying monthly 'advances' from bank credit against future (often unrealised) earnings. This was formally prohibited as a disguised wage-system, but the practice recurred repeatedly. The major success of the co-operative movement was in peri-urban areas, where a large proportion of the members came from households with member engaged in wage or other forms of off-farm employment.

Conflict also arose over the requirement that co-operative members should not be allowed to hire wage labour. The leaders of the co-operatives were generally men from prosperous peasant households, who often recruited extra-familial labour for work in their fields. As one man from Cabo Delgado ingenuously put it when the wage labour statute was debated at a 1980 national meeting on co-operatives, 'Who is to help my wife in my fields when I am off attending all of these meetings?' One cotton-growing co-operative in Gaza even used 'advances' to hire seasonal workers from outside the co-operative.

A third recurrent debate between the Ministry and co-operative leaders was over choice of technique (and thus investment credit). Frelimo expected that economies of scale achieved by grouping together scattered rural producers would lead to immediate increases in the productivity of co-operatives relative to peasant 'subsistence' cultivation. Although tractor hire was used as an initial incentive to encourage co-operative membership, the Ministry wanted to promote increased use of animal traction. In meeting after meeting, Ministry officials explained why the country could not yet afford to extend machine use to all rural producers, or even to existing co-operatives, while co-operative leaders, feigning non-comprehension, demanded more, better and cheaper tractor services. Without access to machine-use, fuel and specialised inputs, the stratum of the peasantry represented in co-operative leadership recognised that they would attain much lower productivity and income farming in co-operatives than in their private farms.

Where co-operatives were successful, then, it was not because they were collectivising private production, but because they provided either access to social security or the defence of private production in the face of market restriction. Grouping together in producer co-operatives rural people of

different economic strata who organised their livelihoods in sharply different ways worked only in the context of the extreme goods famine. Even then, co-operatives were defensive alliances for acquiring food, consumer goods and inputs, providing security of livelihood for some, but effective only insofar as they did not integrate the broad mass of rural people. No single form of co-operativisation – of production, marketing, or input provisioning – could be appropriate for all rural producers, and some rural people had more to gain from regular wage employment than from any producer co-operative.

### *Protection of Basic Needs Through the Plan*

A critical element of Frelimo's strategy of accumulation was the need to assure basic needs through planned control of consumer goods, during the years of extreme austerity envisioned as necessary for rapid growth. Thus uniform national producer and consumer prices were set, the state established a monopoly of wholesale trade and a retail grid of state shops and consumer co-operatives replaced private traders in rural areas. Yet by 1983, most of the rural retail grid had been privatised, state firms had lost their monopoly positions in wholesale trade, and many rural producers were being paid official prices for their crops while paying parallel market prices for consumer goods. In short, the plan was losing control over rural distribution, and some were getting rich as brokers on parallel markets while the broad mass of rural people came close to what Roesch [1986] called a crisis of peasant reproduction. Rural households were brought to the edge of famine in many regions in the early 1980s.

The restriction of private markets meant a draconian assault on the highly diverse range of petty commodity production which characterised rural livelihoods. State marketing of peasant produce was organised for cotton and the principal staples, but initially no alternative was provided for the marketing of meat, poultry and specialised peasant commercial crops such as dried cassava, sweet potatoes, coconuts and fresh fruits and vegetables, all marketed by peasant farmers. There were no channels of distribution for raw materials – sheet metal, lumber, cement – or tools and spare parts for the numerous part-time blacksmiths, carpenters, masons, shoemakers and tailors who serviced rural communities. In Manica [CEA research Manica, 1988], years' worth of rusting broken ploughs, that could have been repaired by local smiths, hung from rafters.

Frelimo's restriction of local trade in food was particularly hard on those rural people whose livelihoods depended on purchasing food since their own production did not necessarily cover their subsistence needs. Songs recorded in Inhambane [CEA research Homoine, 1977] about hunger in 1977 complained about the prices not only of sugar, but also of

maize and peanuts, which are local crops. In speaking with women and young girls doing casual labour on state and private farms in Maputo province [CEA research Sabie, 1980; Marracuene, 1983], we found that they were working because they had nothing in their granaries at home. An epidemic of wasting paralysis in Nampula was caused by eating bitter manioc without adequate processing, a risk accepted by those without stocks of food.

Class stratification and diversity of livelihoods meant that as parallel markets strengthened, the effects of goods starvation were socially differentiated. Those with a basis for turning commercial profit – traders, mill owners, small farmers with transport, large commercial growers, skilled and office workers in state farms and commercial enterprises – were able to accumulate earnings which protected their level of consumption and provided funds they were hungry to invest. Peasants farming close to transport corridors were able to sell surpluses at high parallel market prices to consumers, but small growers in hinterland areas continued to be dependent on state marketing brigades. Skilled workers and government officials could purchase regular quotas of consumer goods at official prices, but poor women farmers and casual workers could not. On one small capitalist farm, provided with food rations at official prices through the plan, we found workers extending their working hours in the afternoon only for the right to purchase food with the wages they earned in the morning [CEA research Marracuene, 1983]. Smaller commercial producers also used their own food stocks to attract casual workers. Those rural people most able to profit from the development of parallel markets or to defend their level of consumption were those living close to commercial centres and trade arteries, on prime commercial land.

Though concerned with preventing the rise of an agrarian petty bourgeoisie from the ranks of the peasantry, Frelimo policy in fact consolidated its power by limiting the range of off-farm employment and making poor peasant households increasingly dependent on links to richer peasants for the protection of their livelihoods. It also provided a rural base of accumulation for the rise of a largely urban and parasitical petty bourgeoisie, often party members based in state enterprises and the army as well as private traders, using commercial profit derived from diversion of inputs from state farms and co-operatives and access to goods through state enterprises. This new petty bourgeoisie, seeking investment outlets, was able to turn the slogan of Frelimo's fourth party congress – 'Land should belong to those with capacity to work it' – to 'Land should belong to those with the capital to work it'.

## STAGNATION AND THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE WAR

The failures of its strategy of accumulation, exacerbated by externally organised assault on economic targets, led Frelimo to retreat from its revolutionary project of social and political transformation into a series of defensive measures. These heightened contradictions between the state and diverse groups of rural people and thus contributed to Renamo's capacity to move beyond tightly targeted terrorist operations, based on external logistical and organisational support, to a generalised presence in the countryside.

Given the weak economic results of state farms, Frelimo revised its position on the place of private commercial production with the Fourth Party Congress in 1983. Measures taken, however, tended to favour rural commercial capital and capitalist farming at the expense of small producers and those dependent on casual wage-work or remittances. Large private farmers were gradually given greater priority in access to inputs through the plan and former settler farmers were allowed to export part of their profits in foreign exchange. Official producer prices were increased and more consumer goods and agricultural implements were provided for sale through marketing agents. These measures were to improve the terms of trade for smallholders and stimulate peasant marketing. However the policy of linkage, under which goods could only be purchased in return for fixed quantities of crops, made it easy for traders to cheat small producers, and further undermined the livelihoods of rural people whose subsistence depended on money-income or savings [*CEA research Marracuene, 1983*].

The slowness of collectivisation led Frelimo to withdraw by 1980 from its project of rapid political transformation of the countryside. Response to the first villagisation campaigns was poor. Outside of Gaza and Cabo Delgado provinces,<sup>21</sup> communal villages never took root as residential units and nowhere did they ever become communes or productive units.<sup>22</sup> Recognising that reorganising residence demanded a concurrent reorganisation of production and capacity to fund communal services, Frelimo withdrew from aggressive villagisation campaigns.<sup>23</sup> What remained was an uneasy and shifting set of alliances between old and new political elements in the governance of local communities: former *régulos* and headmen, the 'new men' of state and party, bureaucrats and state farm managers.

Some of the most onerous tasks of local governance fell on Frelimos' 'new men' – district administrators, secretaries of dynamising groups and presidents of local assemblies. Their legitimacy was undermined as they turned to methods used by the colonial authorities. They conducted periodic labour recruitment campaigns, used identity cards and personal taxes to

enforce recruitment, and intervened in strikes on the side of management. Facing continually declining export crop volumes despite increased producer prices, some officials desperately and ineffectually threatened the peasantry with sanctions.<sup>24</sup> Local officials had to confront the anger of peasants when state farms took over interspersed blocks of peasant land and pasture and closed off with watering points for peasant cattle [CEA research *Angónia*, 1982]. Ironically, some *régulos* emerged from this process with greater legitimacy, both because they became agents of protest and because in many local communities people thought it more secure to handle disputes internally, without inviting the interference of Frelimo.

The failure of the collectivisation process also meant that Frelimo did not reform the structure of employment of the migrant labour system, one of the fundamental aims of its attempt to overcome dualism. Rural unemployment of youth increased with the sharp restriction by the South African government and the Chamber of Mines of recruitment of new Mozambican miners, and the exodus of rural youth evinced in 1980 (Table 2) continued. Young men floated between town and country in search of work. Village militias absorbed a few, but they were unpaid, often undisciplined and sometimes brutal. Petty theft increased in the cities, and migrants crowded prisons and re-education centres. Young men crossed borders illegally, including those marked by electrified and patrolled fences between South Africa and Mozambique.

In 1983, Frelimo launched 'Operation Production', the forced removal of the unemployed from the principal cities to rural areas where they were dumped on local administrators and assigned as workers on both state and private farms. Some starved, some stole, some made it back to the city, and many ended up with Renamo. Renamo also kidnapped recruits from re-education centres and gave captured local militia members the choice of deserting to Renamo or being killed. Illegal migrants in South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe were recruited there for Renamo (in the case of the first two with government support). And some joined Renamo of their own accord.

Without transformation in the organisation of rural livelihoods, Frelimo's concentration of investment in state farms located in prime commercial areas reinforced the sharp regional divides that rapid socialisation of the countryside was intended to efface. Both official channels and parallel markets directed goods, people and wealth to cities, major transport corridors and fertile, irrigated agricultural areas. The hinterlands were labour reserves, impoverished, drought-prone, subject to famine, open to Renamo assault, areas where Frelimo gave rural people little to defend. Frelimo army units were clustered in defense of the major transport corridors and state enterprises, thus it was in the hinterland areas



that Renamo first established its own territories, and through which it moved to organise massacres on the roads and the burning of schools and health-posts. In these hinterlands, some rural communities, under the direction of *regulos*, crossed voluntarily to Renamo, deliberately putting themselves outside the control of the Frelimo state [Geffray, 1990].

#### WAR AND RURAL SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

The period discussed in this paper ended more than ten years ago. Is the debate around its interpretation merely academic then? Given the changes wrought by years of grinding war, what relevance has it today? Did the war, as Hermele [1992: 172] suggests, restrict peasant differentiation by closing down all opportunities for accumulation outside trade and transport? Did the peasantry under the *regulos* withdraw from the market to subsistence production? The rural research which has burgeoned since the end of the war will soon allow us to answer these questions more carefully, but there is already evidence that the war heightened regional unevenness and sharpened both the diversification of livelihoods and class stratification.

The dislocations of war forced many peasants out of farming and impoverished others, increasing the importance of off-farm employment and income for rural livelihoods. Living as refugees outside the country, or as displaced persons in camps, many lacked access to secure plots for even marginal subsistence. The life of the camps extended in the countryside the proliferation of non-agricultural activities for women that characterises peri-urban livelihoods – charcoal-burning, vending, brewing, prostitution, casual labour. Tens of thousands of young men were torn away almost completely from agrarian production. Those who might have once invested earnings from migrant work or casual labour in building their own households and farms lived in the bush as Frelimo and Renamo soldiers, or fled clandestinely to South Africa and Zimbabwe. Cut off from the regular sources of off-farm income that was organisationally part of smallholder production, even rural households that had once produced agricultural surpluses fell into periodic dependence on food aid.

The war also sharpened the fault lines of rural class stratification, and heightened the struggle for commercial land. Hermele [1993] is concerned principally with the weakness of the process of formation of *national* capital, and thus his observations on the levelling tendencies of the war apply to the internal class stratification of the peasantry, what Mamdani [1987] has called 'accumulation from below.' This can verge, however, on that dualism which sees the world of the peasantry as homogeneous, clearly demarcated from the world of commercial enterprises. The appropriation of secure commercial land by international capital, speculative commercial

capital, urban-based capitalist farmers *and* by peasant capitalists, advanced with the war and concurrent turn to economic liberalisation, particularly after the onset of structural adjustment in 1987 [CEA research *Maputo Green Zones*, 1985 and *Manica*, 1988; *Bowen*, 1992, 1993; *Myers and West*, 1993].

Defensive resettlement and villagisation schemes, which regrouped dispersed peasant households along roads to defend protected corridors, created tensions over land use between newcomers and original residents [Geffray and Pederson, 1986]. The war drove smallholders off their land and into refugee camps in rich commercial areas along the Malawi and Zimbabwe borders, and some land was appropriated by new occupants. Land conflicts emerged most sharply, however, over commercial land in the protected corridors and peri-urban areas to which the refugees fled.

The war completed the financial ruin of the state farms. Processing plants and extensive cropping areas were destroyed on tea and sugar plantations, and outlying farms were not safe enough to be efficiently cultivated or to market their produce. In this context, multinational corporations like Lonrho negotiated joint ventures with the state to appropriate prime commercial lands, and raised private armies to defend them. Capitalist farmers in Gaza and Maputo provinces, some of them former settlers, cleared 'abandoned' land, and legitimated their claims by distributing part to peasants made landless by the war. Government officials, state farm managers and high army officers also laid claim to commercial land divested by the state and to peri-urban plots.

Although official policy envisioned the distribution of state farm land to smallholders as well, the poorest families, particularly those headed by women, had difficulty both in obtaining land and in holding on to it. They could not wend their way through the bureaucratic processes necessary for land-claims and credit applications, nor pay the bribes to local officials needed to advance their claims. Some irrigated state-farm land in the South was distributed to smallholders, but many had difficulty holding on to it and working it productively. The poorer women-headed households had neither the labour nor regular income needed to hire labour and draft animals or to purchase inputs.<sup>25</sup> The more prosperous farmers lobbied for the expulsion of poor families from the irrigation schemes because they did not have the labour needed to maintain their sections of drainage ditches. The position of small and medium-scale capitalist farmers was further enhanced throughout the country by the easy credit and access to transport and machinery which they received through USAID.

As capitalist farmers and enterprises extended their hold on secure commercial land, the war resolved their labour recruitment problems. Rural refugees sought work in peri-urban areas and protected corridors. In the

Beira Corridor, protected by Zimbabwean forces, a Zimbabwe-based tobacco firm set up a contract-farming scheme, easily finding landless peasants willing to join. Refugee children left the camps to work as servants for more prosperous local farmers. In the Limpopo region and in green zones around Maputo, refugees worked for a pittance wage on private farms.

Rural class stratification was sharpest in the centres of accumulation – where there was secure commercial land with infrastructures, transport and military protection. The levelling of poverty was most pronounced in the old labour reserves, left open to Renamo pillage and/or occupation. The war thus augmented the regional differences in class structure shaped by divergent patterns of colonial exploitation and redefined the meaning of ethnicity.

#### STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, PEACE AND THE TRAVAILS OF THE SMALLHOLDER MODEL

Mozambique's structural adjustment programme, adopted in the last years of the war, was based on the idea that rural recovery would lie in liberalisation, promotion of smallholder production and decentralisation of the operation of the state. With rapid privatisation and divestiture of state farm land large-scale landholders have taken over most prime commercial land [Myers, 1994]. Nor is the state assisting smallholders. With restriction of the national budget, under one per cent of recurrent public sector expenditure went to agriculture between 1990 and 1994 [Wuyts, 1995: 39]. Even with peace, the withdrawal of refugees from peri-urban areas and rural centres of accumulation and the reintegration of young men into agriculture have been very slow.

Proponents of the smallholder policy argue that these problems result from the unwillingness of state cadres to implement it properly – their refusal to adopt a substantial reform of land law, the stubborn clinging of Frelimo cadres to their conception of a backward peasantry, their collusion with large-scale agrarian capital and speculative commercial interests. This explanation is partial. The smallholder model, as a strategy of agrarian transformation, is impossible to implement in the context of the agrarian class structure of Mozambique – and that of the rest of Southern Africa. In focussing so sharply on control of land, smallholder policy addresses one important aspect of rural differentiation but ignores the ways in which diversification of rural livelihoods and dependence on off-farm income make their own potent contribution to class and gender differentiation.

Households that reintegrate most easily into smallholder production, and can assert and maintain rights to commercial land, are those with access to

regular wages or income from fishing, trade, or artisanal production. Long after the cease-fire, the remaining residents of a refugee camp in Gaza were women, some saying that they were waiting for their husbands to come back from South Africa before leaving, others saying they hadn't the money to leave [Myers *et al.*, 1994: 67–8]. Without regular wage-employment, young men who do not find work in neighbouring countries, many with experience of arms, live by wit and banditry. Off-farm employment is critical not only for the reproduction of peasants as smallholders, but also for the reintegration of thousands of demobilised soldiers into rural life.

## CONCLUSION

I have argued in this article that both Frelimo and its traditionalist critics have looked at agrarian class structure through a divided glass which allowed neither to understand the complex interdependence between off-farm employment, smallholder production and large-scale agricultural enterprises. Politically, they represent transposed versions of populism – the state either represents or is opposed to the interests of *all* the peasantry.

There are, however, many reasons why a dualist vision was compelling for Frelimo. Colonial society was repressively dualistic at the political and rural levels and to some extent socially and culturally as well. Frelimo intellectuals had been in exile when structural changes in colonial labour regimes and commoditisation eroded the earlier and clearer divisions between indigenous peasants and commercial settler farmers. But Frelimo's analytical dualism was also rooted in the Marxist discourse that defined its language of socialist construction. Many planners grounded in the Soviet theory of a non-capitalist road of development saw the Mozambican peasantry living in a semi-feudal or otherwise pre-capitalist world. Western Marxists criticised both this evolutionism and the dualism of modernisation theory but neither the concept of articulation of modes of production nor that of semi-proletarianisation provided us with an alternative analytical language to dualistic developmentalism. It is this analytical failure, as well as the unravelling of socialist revolutionary projects, that has made us vulnerable to the reassertion of dualism, in the guise of post-modernist relativism, in the traditionalist account.

Viewing agrarian class structure in Southern Africa through an undivided glass presents the problem and challenge of grasping a highly complex totality, but this is preferable to the illusory simplification of dualism and its invitation to populism. There was and is no strategy of agrarian transformation for Mozambique that can focus on a single sector – either large-scale enterprises or smallholders. For the broad mass of rural people, income from off-farm employment is needed to establish and

maintain agricultural production. Resolution of the agrarian question in Mozambique, as in the rest of Southern Africa, requires not only land reform but a strategy for the global transformation of the class structure of the migrant labour system. This must take account of the generalisation of wage labour relations that underlies the diversification of rural livelihoods.

## NOTES

- 1 Among contributors to this critique have been French scholars of Mozambique [Geffray, 1990; Cahen, 1993], anthropologist I.B. Lundin, K. Hermele [1992], and researchers linked to the Land Tenure Centre at the University of Wisconsin [Tanner *et al.*, 1992, Myers and West, 1993].
- 2 These proposals were advanced by researchers associated with the Land Tenure Centre of the University of Wisconsin at a highly informative 1994 national conference on land [cf. Eliseu, 1994; Myers, 1994; Tanner, 1994], sponsored by USAID and the Ford Foundation, with participation of Mozambican political figures as well as researchers.
3. Failure to recognise diversification of rural livelihoods has been a central weakness of proponents of the smallholder model. An important 1989 World Bank study on food security in Mozambique argued, for example, that 'The off-farm employment picture has never been very bright in rural Mozambique, as is the case throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa' [World Bank, 1989].
4. See Robertson [1987] on the diversity of class positions within tenancy in Lesotho.
5. The rural research of the CEA began when its director, Aquino de Bragança, who always insisted that Mozambique's history be located within Africa and within the southern African region, invited the fiercely brilliant ANC political activist and intellectual Ruth First to organise a study of how to transform southern Mozambique from a migrant labour reserve for the South African mines. The resulting research report was eventually published in English as *Black Gold* [First, 1983]. First remained as research director of the CEA until her assassination, in her office at the university, by a parcel bomb sent by South African security services in 1982. The research agenda of the CEA and its relationship to the Frelimo party are outlined in a statement published by members of the CEA in the *Review of African Political Economy*, No.25, in 1983. Aquino de Bragança died in 1986 in the crash, under suspicious circumstances, of Samora Machel's plane in South Africa.
6. I am using the term "stratification" here without any intention to connote the broad social groupings of Weberian theory. Rather I want to argue that internal class stratification of the peasantry – the emergence of clearly defined groups with different relations to the means of production is only one (and a not inevitable) aspect of the subordination of the peasantry to capitalist class relations.
7. Although the census included questions on migrancy, occupational status and employment status, categories were exclusive. Respondents were asked to define only their *principal* occupation. Thus it is not possible to identify, for example, seasonal wage-workers and migrants, wage-workers who were also employers, farmers who were also brewers or builders.
8. For example, women and children accounted for 78 per cent of the casual labour days registered by the colonial agricultural census in 1970 in Gaza province [Missão de Inquérito Agrícola de Moçambique, 1973].
9. This classification reflects three different effects of the process of diversification: permanent dislocation of men from rural areas, leading to sexual imbalance in the resident population; long-term male migrancy so that women are viewed as effective heads of farming households; and rural men's involvement in off-farm employment (two extreme outliers are island fishing districts).
10. If a male head of household was present and working in agriculture, then women were classified as family workers rather than independent farmers.

11. The exclusive categories of the census, which precluded simultaneous identification as wage-worker and employer of labour, inevitably led to an underestimation of the number of small capitalist producers. So did the political climate of the time.
12. It is, however, quite true, as Bruce [1993] points out, that while communal tenure prohibits the development of a land market and protects parallel land claims, it is not incompatible with individual land tenure.
13. Tanner *et al.* [1992: 10] have suggested that both Portuguese and Mozambicans in the Limpopo irrigation scheme were contract workers disguised as small family farmers.
14. This intra-provincial differentiation in class structure is reflected in the broad range of differences between districts in the role of women farmers indicated by the standard deviations registered in Table 3.
15. In 1967, 34 per cent of the cotton marketed by the peasantry, 66 per cent of the rice, 62 per cent of the peanuts, 85 per cent of the cashew nuts, 97 per cent of the sesame and 94 per cent of the tobacco came from Nampula [*Missão de Inquérito Agrícola de Moçambique*, 1969].
16. A Ministry of Agriculture 1977 document (Ministério da Agricultura, 1977) on co-operatives, for example, affirmed that the great majority of peasant communities in Mozambique were dominated by pre-feudal relations of production with a low level of development of the productive forces and production for auto-consumption. It concluded that in Mozambique the process of co-operativisation would have to lead the peasantry to do two different things to which they were not accustomed: produce collectively and produce surpluses for the market. This argument resembles Hyden's [1980] characterisation of the 'uncaptured peasantry' in his analysis of *ujamaa* in Tanzania.
17. There was debate around regrouping individual holdings into blocks as an intermediate step to full collectivisation, but this was rejected, for some because of its timidity and for others because of peasant denunciations of its similarity to colonial settlement schemes [cf. *Habermeier*, 1981].
18. Pressure from rural people prompted the flight of many settler farmers and traders, and there were waves of denunciations of the abuses of *régulos* and people with links to the colonial security services.
19. In the early 1980s several of the large state farms were giving workers food rations imported by the World Food Programme.
20. In one co-operative in Maputo province, women members in song called their co-operative a house of exploitation and referred to themselves as old women with nothing to eat or wear, who began work at dawn, and never bothered anyone [*CEA research Matutuine*, 1979].
21. In Cabo Delgado, villagisation began before Independence. Communal villages were established in Frelimo held areas during the national liberation struggle, and the Portuguese army grouped people into 'protected hamlets'. In Gaza, large communal villages were formed after floods in 1976 and 1977, moving residences out of fertile but vulnerable valley land to higher dunes and allowing the state-farms to expand their holdings of irrigable valley land at the same time.
22. None the less, there was not uniform opposition to villagisation. In villages in Gaza, for example, women appreciated communal wells and village life [*Roesch*, 1986; *Huesken and Kamphuis*, 1986]. They also took on an active role in political life; in the village studied by Roesch [1986], for example, the first co-operative president was a woman, as were the heads of the vigilance and militia units.
23. As Renamo extended its attacks in rural areas in the 1980s, the government once more began to regroup rural people into villages, defensively and often by force, for military reasons and without any pretense of social and political transformation [cf. *Geffray*, 1990].
24. The most well-known case came later, with the war entrenched in rural areas, when the governor of Nampula province announced that producing cotton and cashew was not a favour but an order of the state [*Moyana*, 1986].
25. The development bank organised a scheme for sale of draft animals on credit to poor households in Gaza province, but lacking labour to tend and employ them productively many slaughtered the cattle and defaulted on the loans.

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